The that showed them having trouble moving forward

The Lanzhou-Lhasa highway was the most ideal
logistical land supply route at 2,148 km long. In order to assess the
conditions of these routes for transport, certain factors such as road
construction, width, grades, curves, bottlenecks, and road conditions impacted
by weather are heavily taken into consideration.1 The
CIA estimated that  to support 90,000
troops in the region, China would have to use the Lan-chou-Lhasa highway to its
capacity and would require around 7,000 supply trucks per month. However, such
heavy usage of the road was estimated to cause substantial damage. The CIA also
considered how a build-up of Chinese troops would affect the railroads and
determined that, although congestion could impose some burden on the supply
chain, there would really be no significant effect on the lines. However, if
one of the lines failed due to a washout or other reason, supplies would have
to be trucked into the staging areas, which the CIA determined would be a
time-consuming operation.49
Petroleum usage in Tibet was estimated at 2.7% of China’s total availability,
with a total usage of around 200,000 tons for the year.2 The
“blue satchel raid” of the Chinese was considered one of the greatest
intelligence hauls in the history of the CIA. This raid obtained Chinese
government documents that showed them having trouble moving forward with the
spread of communism through Tibet. It gave the CIA good insight into what was
going on in China, and for the first time they really had authentic Chinese
documents that were not made up or given to them by a rogue agent. This changed
the focus of the CIA as they informed the Tibetans not to attack the Chinese
but to gather intelligence on them.3


2   “Transmittal
of Paper on Impact of the Tibetan Campaign on the Economy of Communist China |
CIA FOIA (”. Retrieved 2017-02-05.

3   “CIA’s
Secret War in Tibet | HistoryNet”. Retrieved 2017-02-07.